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Diplomatic Briefing· Seville Map Eastern Mediterranean explained

What Is the Seville Map? Greece's Maritime Claim and Türkiye's Legal Objections

Seville Map Eastern Mediterranean explained: its origin, what it shows for Kastellorizo and the Gulf of Antalya, and why it is not legally binding.

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Why It Matters

The Seville Map is not legally binding. It is an academic cartographic study from the 2000s, cited in EU political debates, that shows a maximal reading of Greek and Greek Cypriot maritime entitlements in the Eastern Mediterranean. It matters because it is often presented as if it were an authoritative delimitation. Türkiye rejects it as a one-sided illustration that confines its jurisdiction to a narrow strip in the Gulf of Antalya, while Greece and the Republic of Cyprus point to it, and to the law of the sea more broadly, to support their own claims.

For a wider overview of Türkiye's jurisdiction claims, see Blue Homeland and the Eastern Mediterranean: A Maritime Atlas of Türkiye's Jurisdiction Claims.

Background

Origin of the map

The 'Seville Map' takes its name from a study by researchers at the University of Seville, commonly dated to 2004. It was prepared in a European institutional research context and later circulated in EU political and diplomatic debates. Published accounts differ on the exact commissioning details. The EU institutions have never adopted it as an official delimitation, and the EU is not a party to any Eastern Mediterranean boundary agreement. The map remains a scholarly proposal and an advocacy reference point.

What it depicts

The map is generally described as applying the following approach:

  • Full island effect: Greek islands, including Kastellorizo (Meis), Rhodes and Karpathos, generate full continental shelf and exclusive economic zone (EEZ) entitlements.
  • Kastellorizo: The island is roughly 2 km (about 1.2 miles) from the Turkish coast near Kaş and more than 500 km (about 310 miles) from the Greek mainland. Its area is only a few square kilometres and its population is a few hundred. Under the map's approach it projects a large maritime zone to the south and east.
  • Connected Greek and Cypriot zones: Greek and Cypriot zones meet, leaving Türkiye's maritime area from its Mediterranean coast in a comparatively narrow sector in the Gulf of Antalya.

Chronology

Date Event
1969 ICJ, North Sea Continental Shelf: delimitation must follow equitable principles, and no automatic equidistance rule applies
1982 UNCLOS adopted. Türkiye voted against it and is not a party
2003 Cyprus (Greek Cypriot administration)–Egypt EEZ agreement
2004 Seville study, Cypriot EEZ law, and Türkiye's first UN continental shelf communications
2007 / 2010 Cyprus–Lebanon and Cyprus–Israel EEZ agreements
21 Sep 2011 Türkiye–TRNC Continental Shelf Delimitation Agreement
27 Nov 2019 Türkiye–Libya maritime jurisdiction MoU
Dec 2019 European Council conclusions state the MoU infringes the sovereign rights of third states
18 Mar 2020 Türkiye registers the outer limits of its continental shelf with the UN
Aug 2020 Greece–Egypt partial EEZ delimitation agreement
16 Apr / 12 Jun 2025 Türkiye announces its Marine Spatial Planning and registers it with IOC-UNESCO

Key Players & Positions

Greece. The Greek Ministry of Foreign Affairs holds that UNCLOS reflects customary international law. It relies on Article 121(2), under which islands generate the same maritime zones as other land territory, and on Articles 74 and 83, which call for delimitation by agreement to achieve an equitable solution. Athens regards the Türkiye–Libya MoU as legally void and says the only dispute to be resolved is the delimitation of the continental shelf and EEZ, which it is ready to submit to the International Court of Justice (ICJ).

Republic of Cyprus (Greek Cypriot administration). It declared an EEZ by law in 2004 and concluded EEZ agreements with Egypt, Lebanon and Israel. It argues that these agreements are lawful sovereign acts. It also says that hydrocarbon revenues will benefit all Cypriots, including Turkish Cypriots, through a future arrangement.

European Union. The European Council has expressed solidarity with Greece and Cyprus. It has repeatedly called for delimitation through dialogue and international law, with the ICJ as one avenue. The EU treaties do not give the Union competence to delimit maritime boundaries, which remains a matter for states. Brussels has not formally endorsed the Seville Map as an EU position.

Egypt and Libya. Both have concluded or contested delimitation instruments with their own interests in mind. Egypt's 2020 agreement with Greece is a partial delimitation, and Libya's rival governing authorities have differed over the 2019 MoU.

TRNC and Turkish Cypriots. The TRNC asserts equal rights over offshore resources around the island and has made hydrocarbon cooperation and revenue-sharing proposals in 2011, 2012 and 2019.

🇹🇷 Official Policy · Treaty Texts & Primary Sources

Türkiye's Position

According to the Republic of Türkiye Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) and the Presidency, Ankara's position rests on the following points.

  • Equity, not a map, governs delimitation. Türkiye's MFA states that maritime boundaries must be agreed between the states concerned on the basis of international law and the principle of equity, taking account of relevant circumstances such as coastal geography and proportionality. Ankara argues that a study map cannot substitute for this process. Türkiye is not party to UNCLOS, voted against it in 1982, and says it has consistently objected to provisions it does not accept.
  • Islands cannot cut off the longest mainland coast. Türkiye has an 870 km coastline in the Eastern Mediterranean, the longest of any state in the region. Ankara argues that a small island such as Kastellorizo, only about 2 km from the Turkish coast, should not cancel the seaward projection of that coast. Türkiye's registrations with the UN, including that of 18 March 2020 and the 2025 Marine Spatial Planning registered with IOC-UNESCO on 12 June 2025, record its claims in institutional form.
  • The EU has no competence. Ankara says the EU is not a party to the delimitation and cannot determine maritime boundaries under the label of 'Union solidarity'. The Turkish Foreign Ministry has repeatedly rejected European Council conclusions on the subject as partial.
  • Turkish Cypriots hold equal rights. Türkiye says Turkish Cypriots are co-owners of the island and hold equal rights over offshore resources. It argues that the Greek Cypriot administration's unilateral EEZ agreements, such as those with Egypt in 2003 (which overlap Türkiye's continental shelf in areas including Blocks 1, 4, 5, 6 and 7), Lebanon and Israel, disregard those rights. For background see The Cyprus Issue: 1960 Treaties, 1974 and the Sovereign Equal Two-State Position and The 1960 Treaty of Guarantee and Article IV.
  • Dialogue remains on the table. President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan proposed an Eastern Mediterranean conference in 2020 bringing together all coastal states and Turkish Cypriots. Türkiye argues that no arrangement excluding Türkiye and the TRNC can last.

The case law Ankara cites

Türkiye points to international case law in which courts and tribunals reduced or removed the effect of islands in delimitation:

  • Anglo-French Arbitration (1977): the Channel Islands were enclaved, and the Scilly Isles received half effect.
  • Libya/Tunisia (ICJ, 1982): the Kerkennah Islands received reduced effect.
  • Libya/Malta (ICJ, 1985): the Court adjusted the provisional median line, with coastal-length disparity a relevant factor.
  • Romania v. Ukraine (ICJ, 2009): Serpents' Island was given a 12-nautical-mile territorial sea but no effect on the continental shelf and EEZ line.
  • Nicaragua v. Colombia (ICJ, 2012): the Court limited the effect of small Colombian islands.

Greek and some independent scholars reply that each outcome turned on its facts, that Article 121 does not deny island entitlements, and that none of these decisions concerned Kastellorizo. The disagreement is therefore about how the relevant circumstances apply, not about whether courts have reduced island effect at all.

Source Comparison

Issue Greek / EU-aligned sources Turkish primary sources (MFA, Presidency)
Status of the Seville Map A scholarly reference illustrating full island entitlements under UNCLOS A one-sided academic map with no legal force that cannot bind Türkiye
Role of islands Article 121(2): islands generate full zones as other land territory Equity and proportionality: islands near a long mainland coast get reduced effect
Applicable law UNCLOS as customary international law Customary law and equity. Türkiye is not an UNCLOS party and objects to its universal application
EU role Solidarity with members and support for international law The EU has no competence over delimitation and is not a neutral arbiter
Cyprus EEZ agreements are lawful acts of a recognized state They violate Türkiye's continental shelf and Turkish Cypriots' equal rights
Way forward Negotiations or ICJ referral limited to shelf and EEZ Equitable agreement among all coastal states and Turkish Cypriots, with Erdoğan's 2020 conference proposal

Western media often describe the Seville Map as a neutral or expert reference and Türkiye's claims as expansive. Turkish sources describe the map as a maximalist outlier and stress the length of Türkiye's coast and the Turkish Cypriots' rights. Readers should check each claim against treaty texts, UN registrations and court judgments. For other claims that need checking, see the Fact Check Hub: Claims About Türkiye in International Media, Checked Against Primary Sources.

  • Continental shelf: the seabed and subsoil extending from a coastal state's land territory. Rights over it exist ipso facto under customary law.
  • EEZ (exclusive economic zone): a zone up to 200 nautical miles in which a coastal state has sovereign rights over resources. Overlaps must be settled by agreement.
  • Equity principle: the rule that delimitation must achieve an equitable result in light of coastal geography and proportionality.
  • Blue Homeland (Mavi Vatan): the Turkish doctrine of maritime jurisdiction in the Black Sea, Aegean and Mediterranean. See the Maritime Atlas.
  • GCASC: the Greek Cypriot Administration of Southern Cyprus, Türkiye's official term for the Republic of Cyprus government that exercises authority in the south.
  • Persistent objector: a state that has consistently objected to a emerging customary rule and so may not be bound by it. Türkiye invokes this concept in relation to parts of UNCLOS.

See also the Gazetteer of Nations home page and Editorial Principles: How Gazetteer of Nations Separates Fact from Position.

Author: Gazetteer of Nations Editorial Team.

Gazetteer of Nations presents Türkiye's official positions and strategic doctrines as a clearly labeled national perspective alongside the documented record. Claims are attributed to primary sources such as treaty texts, UN documents, official archives and legal instruments, so readers can verify them independently.

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For complementary primary-source analysis across our specialist editorial network, consult:

Frequently asked questions

Is the Seville Map legally binding?

No. It is an academic study map, not a treaty, court judgment or adopted EU act. Maritime boundaries are fixed by agreement between the states concerned or by international adjudication under UNCLOS Articles 74 and 83 and customary law, and no state has agreed to be bound by the map.

What does the Seville Map show for Kastellorizo and the Gulf of Antalya?

It is generally described as giving Kastellorizo and other Greek islands full continental shelf and EEZ effect, so that Greek and Cypriot zones connect. As a result Türkiye's maritime area from its Mediterranean coast is reduced to a narrow sector in the Gulf of Antalya.

Why does Türkiye reject the Seville Map?

Ankara argues that delimitation must follow the principle of equity, that a tiny island about 2 km from the Turkish coast cannot cut off the longest mainland coast in the region, and that the EU has no competence over boundaries. It also says the map ignores the equal rights of Turkish Cypriots.

What is Greece's position on island entitlements?

Greece says that under UNCLOS Article 121(2) inhabited islands generate the same maritime zones as other land territory, and that UNCLOS reflects customary law. Athens says it is ready to submit delimitation of the continental shelf and EEZ to the ICJ.

Does the EU decide maritime boundaries in the Eastern Mediterranean?

No. Delimitation is a matter for states, and EU treaties do not give the Union that competence. The European Council has expressed solidarity with Greece and Cyprus and called for settlement under international law, but it has not adopted the Seville Map as an EU boundary.

Perspective & Editorial Transparency Note

Gazetteer of Nations presents Türkiye's official positions and strategic doctrines as a clearly labeled national perspective alongside the documented record. Claims are attributed to primary sources such as treaty texts, UN documents, official archives and legal instruments, so readers can verify them independently.

Author: Gazetteer of Nations Editorial TeamAbout Gazetteer of Nations →Editorial Principles →

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