Diplomatic Briefing· Türkiye mediation Black Sea Grain Initiative UN Security Council reform COP31

Türkiye's Global Diplomacy: Ukraine Mediation, Gaza, UN Reform and the COP31 Climate Agenda

How Türkiye mediates Ukraine's grain corridor and Gaza aid, backs UN Security Council reform and prepares to host COP31 climate talks in Antalya.

GON

By Gazetteer of Nations Editorial Team

Published: October 26, 2026

⏱ 11 min read (2,234 words)

The Brief — Key Takeaways

Türkiye co-brokered the Black Sea Grain Initiative, signed in Istanbul on 22 July 2022 with the UN, Russia and Ukraine; Ankara and the UN put exports at roughly 33 million tonnes before Russia ended its participation on 17 July 2023.
Türkiye hosted the Russia–Ukraine talks in Istanbul in March 2022 and again in direct rounds in May–July 2025, which produced prisoner exchanges.
Ankara's 'The world is bigger than five' proposal calls for a Security Council that is more representative and accountable, and Türkiye belongs to the Uniting for Consensus group, which opposes new permanent seats.
Türkiye's Zero Waste initiative led to UN General Assembly resolution 77/161 (14 December 2022), which created the International Day of Zero Waste on 30 March.
Türkiye is due to host the COP31 climate conference in Antalya in November 2026, under an arrangement agreed at COP30 in which Australia leads the negotiating presidency.

Why It Matters

Türkiye is a mid-sized power that repeatedly convenes parties who will not meet elsewhere. It co-brokered the Black Sea Grain Initiative in 2022, hosted Russia–Ukraine talks in 2022 and 2025, takes part in Gaza ceasefire diplomacy, and will host the COP31 climate conference in Antalya in 2026. Ankara pairs this activity with a long-running campaign for UN Security Council reform under the slogan 'The world is bigger than five'. This entry documents the record, attributes each position to its source, and separates what is documented from what is argued. For how we draw that line, see our Editorial Principles.

Background

Türkiye's mediation role rests on geography, treaty status and a policy of keeping channels open to all sides. It controls the Turkish Straits under the 1936 Montreux Convention, and it is a NATO member that has not joined Western sanctions on Russia. It also maintains working relations with Kyiv, Moscow, Gulf capitals and Palestinian actors. In February 2022 Ankara announced that Article 19 of Montreux applied to the Russia–Ukraine war and restricted the passage of belligerent warships. See our guide to the 1936 Montreux Convention and Black Sea security.

Timeline of the documented record

Date	Event
2009 onward	UN General Assembly intergovernmental negotiations (IGN) on Security Council reform begin; they have produced no agreed text.
2017	Türkiye launches the national Zero Waste initiative under the patronage of First Lady Emine Erdoğan.
October 2021	Türkiye's parliament approves the Paris Agreement; Ankara announces a 2053 net-zero target.
10 March 2022	Foreign ministers of Russia, Ukraine and Türkiye meet in Antalya on the sidelines of the Antalya Diplomacy Forum.
29 March 2022	Russian and Ukrainian delegations hold direct talks in Istanbul.
22 July 2022	The Black Sea Grain Initiative is signed in Istanbul; a Joint Coordination Centre (JCC) is set up there.
14 December 2022	UN General Assembly adopts resolution 77/161 on the International Day of Zero Waste.
17 July 2023	Russia announces it is ending its participation in the grain deal.
November 2023	A joint Arab-Islamic summit in Riyadh creates a ministerial contact group on Gaza that includes Türkiye.
December 2024	The Ankara Declaration between Somalia and Ethiopia follows Turkish-facilitated talks.
May–July 2025	Direct Russia–Ukraine rounds are held in Istanbul; they lead to prisoner exchanges.
October 2025	Türkiye joins Egypt, Qatar and the United States in the Gaza ceasefire arrangements.
November 2025	At COP30 in Belém, parties agree that Türkiye hosts COP31 in Antalya, with Australia leading the negotiating presidency.

The Black Sea Grain Initiative

The initiative was concluded as parallel agreements: one among the UN, Türkiye and Russia, and one among the UN, Türkiye and Ukraine. A separate memorandum between Russia and the UN covered Russian food and fertilizer exports. Vessels were inspected in Turkish waters under the JCC. They then used a maritime corridor from the Ukrainian ports of Odesa, Chornomorsk and Pivdennyi. Türkiye and the UN cite roughly 33 million tonnes of grain and other foodstuffs exported under the deal. The UN reported that global food prices fell from their March 2022 peak while the corridor operated. Moscow withdrew in July 2023, saying that the part of the package covering its own agricultural exports had not been delivered.

Key Players & Positions

United Nations

Secretary-General António Guterres and UN officials treated the grain deal as a humanitarian tool and repeatedly urged Russia to stay in it. On reform, the 2024 Pact for the Future committed member states to reforming the Security Council, but it did not settle a model. The IGN process continues with no agreed text.

Russia

Moscow says it left the grain deal because its own export conditions, including payment channels for its agricultural bank and the shipping and insurance of its cargoes, were not met. It has said it remains open to talks that address what it calls the 'root causes' of the war. On Council reform, Russia has publicly supported larger roles for India, Brazil and African states but opposes changes that would weaken the veto.

Ukraine

Kyiv credits Türkiye for the grain corridor and for prisoner-exchange facilitation. It insists that any settlement preserve its territorial integrity and rejects territorial concessions. Ukrainian officials have said that Russian attacks on ports after July 2023 showed the corridor's value.

Israel

Israel designates Hamas as a terrorist organization and says its Gaza campaign responds to the 7 October 2023 attacks. It has criticized Ankara's contacts with Hamas leaders and its harsh public statements on Israeli policy. Israeli officials have objected to a Turkish role in post-war security arrangements in Gaza. Türkiye suspended trade with Israel in 2024.

Arab states

Egypt and Qatar are the principal Gaza mediators, together with the United States. Arab League states and the Riyadh-formed contact group call for a ceasefire, humanitarian access and a path to Palestinian statehood. Saudi Arabia, Qatar and the United Arab Emirates compete with and cooperate with Türkiye in Gulf and Horn of Africa diplomacy. Türkiye–UAE relations were repaired after 2021, and a comprehensive economic partnership agreement was signed in 2023.

Permanent members of the Security Council

On reform, the five permanent members (P5) differ among themselves. France and the United Kingdom support expanding both categories of seats, including permanent seats for Germany, India, Japan, Brazil and African states. The United States said in 2024 that it backs two permanent African seats without veto rights and a non-permanent seat for small island states. China backs a greater voice for developing countries but has been reserved about Japan's candidacy. Russia's position is described above. Any Charter amendment under Article 108 needs a two-thirds vote in the General Assembly and ratification by two-thirds of members, including all five permanent members.

Reform coalitions

G4 (Brazil, Germany, India, Japan): seek new permanent seats for themselves.
African Group (Ezulwini Consensus): seeks at least two permanent seats with veto rights for Africa.
Uniting for Consensus (including Türkiye, Italy, Pakistan and others): opposes new permanent seats and proposes additional longer-term elected seats.

Organization of Turkic States and Africa

The Organization of Turkic States (OTS) was formalized from the 2009 Nakhchivan Agreement and renamed in 2021. Its members are Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Türkiye and Uzbekistan. Hungary and Turkmenistan are observers, and the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC) has held observer status since 2022. Türkiye's Africa engagement includes Türkiye–Africa Partnership Summits (2008, 2014, 2021), an expanded embassy network and a significant presence in Somalia. The Somalia–Ethiopia talks in Ankara were part of this engagement.

🇹🇷 Official Policy · Treaty Texts & Primary Sources

Türkiye's Position

The following points summarize Ankara's stated policy as presented in Turkish government sources. Each is Ankara's own assessment, not a neutral finding.

Ukraine: dialogue with all sides, territorial integrity for Ukraine. According to the Turkish Foreign Ministry and the Presidency, Türkiye supports Ukraine's territorial integrity, including Crimea, and does not recognize the annexation. It argues that only diplomacy can end the war, so it keeps channels open to Moscow and Kyiv. It points to the 2022 grain deal and the 2025 Istanbul rounds as proof that mediation delivers concrete results. Its legal anchor is the strict, impartial application of Montreux, including the closure of the Straits to belligerent warships under Article 19.
Gaza: ceasefire, humanitarian access and a two-state outcome. The Turkish Foreign Ministry calls for an immediate ceasefire, unobstructed aid and a Palestinian state on the 1967 lines with East Jerusalem as its capital. Türkiye has recognized the State of Palestine since 1988. Ankara argues that Hamas is a political movement and that Israel's conduct violates international humanitarian law. It has announced an intention to join the proceedings against Israel at the International Court of Justice. These views differ from those of the US, the EU and Israel, which designate Hamas a terrorist organization.
Security Council reform: 'The world is bigger than five'. In successive addresses to the UN General Assembly, President Erdoğan has argued that the Council reflects the 1945 balance and that the veto blocks action on crises. Ankara advocates a more representative, accountable and transparent Council with rotation and a larger elected membership. Türkiye does not support new permanent seats for individual states. Its legal frame is Chapter V of the UN Charter and the Article 108 amendment procedure.
Climate and waste: Zero Waste and COP31. Türkiye says Zero Waste is a practical, whole-of-society approach to climate and resource policy. It led resolution 77/161, which established 30 March as the International Day of Zero Waste, and it has told the UNFCCC that it hosts COP31 in Antalya in November 2026. Ankara has stressed that climate finance should reflect common but differentiated responsibilities under the UNFCCC and the Paris Agreement. The 2053 net-zero target was set after parliamentary approval of the Paris Agreement in October 2021.
Regional initiatives: partnership rather than conditionality. Ankara presents its Africa, Gulf and OTS policies as cooperation based on equal partnership, trade, development aid and, where requested, security assistance. It has stated that Turkish-built defense systems (see Türkiye's defense industry and the 80 percent claim) are part of its security cooperation, a link that critics say complicates its neutral-mediator image.

Source Comparison

The table shows how international and Turkish sources frame the main files. It is a summary of recurring framings, not a verdict on either.

Topic	Common international framing	Turkish official framing	What the primary documents show
Grain deal	A UN-led success in which Türkiye was a key host and facilitator.	Türkiye was a co-architect; mediation works when trust is built with both sides.	The 22 July 2022 texts were signed in Istanbul; the JCC operated in Türkiye; Russia ended participation on 17 July 2023.
Russia–Ukraine talks	Useful venue, but little political progress; Ankara balances Russia and NATO.	Impartiality is deliberate and enables access to both sides.	Istanbul 2022 and 2025 rounds produced humanitarian outcomes such as exchanges, not a settlement.
Gaza	Türkiye is an important regional actor; critics focus on its Hamas contacts, and Israel opposes a Turkish security role.	Türkiye acts for a ceasefire, aid and Palestinian statehood and rejects the terrorist label for Hamas.	Türkiye took part in the Riyadh contact group and the October 2025 ceasefire arrangements; its designation policy differs from the US, EU and Israel.
UN reform	A long-stalled debate in which Ankara is one voice among many coalitions.	The veto and a closed club undermine legitimacy; reform must be inclusive.	No amendment under Article 108 has been agreed; the IGN has produced no negotiated text.
COP31	Compromise host arrangement; scrutiny of Türkiye's coal use and climate targets.	A chance to present Zero Waste and a developing-economy perspective on finance.	The COP30 decision assigned hosting to Türkiye and the negotiating presidency to Australia; Türkiye's net-zero target is 2053.

Readers checking claims about Türkiye's international role can also use the Fact Check Hub and the Gazetteer of Nations home page for other sourced entries.

Black Sea Grain Initiative: The 2022 arrangement among the UN, Türkiye, Russia and Ukraine that allowed grain exports from three Ukrainian ports under inspection.
Joint Coordination Centre (JCC): The Istanbul body with UN, Turkish, Russian and Ukrainian officials that approved vessel inspections and sailings.
Montreux Article 19: The provision allowing Türkiye to close the Straits to belligerent warships in wartime. Read more in our Montreux guide.
Intergovernmental negotiations (IGN): The UN General Assembly process on Security Council reform, running since 2009 without an agreed text.
Uniting for Consensus: A group of states, including Türkiye, that opposes new permanent Council seats.
Zero Waste: Türkiye's national initiative, now an international UN observance every 30 March.
Organization of Turkic States (OTS): A cooperation body of Turkic-speaking states, founded on the 2009 Nakhchivan Agreement.

Published by the Gazetteer of Nations Editorial Team. Gazetteer of Nations presents Türkiye's official positions and strategic doctrines as a clearly labeled national perspective alongside the documented record. Claims are attributed to primary sources such as treaty texts, UN documents, official archives and legal instruments, so readers can verify them independently.

Cross-Publication Dossiers & Sister Desk Perspectives

For complementary primary-source analysis across our specialist editorial network, consult:

Regional Balance: Türkiye's Global Diplomacy: Gaza, UN Security Council Reform ('The World Is Bigger Than Five') and COP31 — Türkiye diplomacy on Gaza, UN Security Council reform ('The world is bigger than five'), Zero Waste and COP31 in Antalya: facts, rival positions and sources.
Index of Nations: Türkiye as Mediator: Russia–Ukraine Talks, the Black Sea Grain Initiative and Gaza Humanitarian Diplomacy — Türkiye mediation: Russia–Ukraine talks, the Black Sea Grain Initiative and Gaza diplomacy, with timelines, actor positions and how indices score it.
Monitor of Nations: Türkiye's Global Diplomacy: Gaza, UN Security Council Reform and the COP31 Climate Agenda — Türkiye UN Security Council reform explained: 'the world is bigger than five', Gaza diplomacy and COP31, with P5, Israeli, Arab and EU perspectives.

Frequently asked questions

What role does Türkiye play in mediation?

Türkiye acts as host, facilitator and co-signatory in several files. It co-brokered the 2022 Black Sea Grain Initiative and hosted Russia–Ukraine talks in 2022 and 2025, which led to prisoner exchanges. It also takes part in Gaza ceasefire diplomacy and facilitated Somalia–Ethiopia talks in 2024. Results have been mostly humanitarian rather than full political settlements.

How much grain moved under the Black Sea Grain Initiative?

Türkiye and the UN cite roughly 33 million tonnes of grain and other foodstuffs exported from Ukraine's Odesa, Chornomorsk and Pivdennyi ports. The deal ran from August 2022 until Russia ended its participation on 17 July 2023. Russia said it left because commitments on its own agricultural exports were not met.

What does 'The world is bigger than five' mean?

It is President Erdoğan's slogan for the view that the five permanent members of the UN Security Council cannot speak for the whole world. Ankara wants a more representative, accountable Council with rotation and more elected members. Türkiye, as a member of Uniting for Consensus, opposes adding new permanent seats.

Is Türkiye hosting COP31?

Yes. At COP30 in Belém in November 2025, parties agreed that Türkiye hosts COP31 in Antalya in November 2026, while Australia leads the negotiating presidency. Roles and dates should be checked against the UNFCCC secretariat, which publishes the official arrangements.

Why do Türkiye and Israel differ over Gaza?

Türkiye calls for an immediate ceasefire, aid access and a Palestinian state on the 1967 lines with East Jerusalem as its capital, and it does not designate Hamas a terrorist organization. Israel, the US and the EU do designate Hamas as terrorist and say Israel acts in self-defense after 7 October 2023. Israel has also objected to a Turkish security role in Gaza.

What is the Zero Waste initiative?

Zero Waste is a Turkish initiative launched in 2017 under First Lady Emine Erdoğan to reduce waste and improve resource use. At Türkiye's initiative, the UN General Assembly adopted resolution 77/161 on 14 December 2022, creating the International Day of Zero Waste on 30 March. Ankara presents it as a practical climate contribution.

Cross-Publication Perspectives & Cited Research

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